

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Chairman:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELLO FRANCO  
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. E. A. GOTTLIEB  
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL  
Mr. A. S. MEHTA  
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. S. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU  
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C. H. von PLATEN  
Mr. S. LÖFGREN  
Mr. ULF ERICSSON

Union of SovietSocialist Republics:

Mr. V. V. KUZNETSOV  
Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. L. J. MENDELEVICH  
Mr. B. J. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J. K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER  
Mr. C. C. STELLE  
Mr. D. E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the ninety-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Eleven months have elapsed since the beginning in this Council Chamber of the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee which has been entrusted by the United Nations with the mandate to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The peoples all the world over place great hopes in the work of our Committee, expressing ever more strongly their desire that a radical solution be found here and now to the issue of all time, the elimination of war as a means of solving differences between States.

We have returned to this table for the fourth time, meeting many colleagues who have attended the proceedings of the Conference in the past and noting the presence of new colleagues, the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Mikael Imra, and the representative of the United States of America, Mr. William Foster. We greet their presence amongst us and wish their efforts to be added to those of this Committee to reach our goal of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

The resumption of our Conference is a positive element in the development of international relations intended to contribute to the creation of a better international political climate, and the promotion of the cause of peace and security all over the world. It is a positive fact that by force of circumstances general and complete disarmament stands first on the international agenda. It is an undeniable truth that today world peace cannot be ensured so long as general and complete disarmament has not been implemented.

Throughout its history mankind has suffered many calamities and war was not the least of them, but never in the course of thousands of years has a greater peril hovered over mankind than that which is hovering above it now in this second half of the twentieth century. A month ago, in Berlin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, stated that in the event of a nuclear war, as a result of the first strike, from 700-800 million men would perish and all the great cities in the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan and other countries would be completely destroyed. That is not war any more: it is a holocaust. That is what we must have in mind when tackling the problem of peace and war, the problem of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and the problem of putting an end to the arms race.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Numerous representatives have emphasized in their interventions that part of the opening speech made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, (ENDC/PV.96, pp. 5 et seq.) in which he referred to the specific character of this fourth session of our Conference. In fact, after an analysis of the situation prevailing now as we resume our proceedings we find, on the one hand, that the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war has become more manifest -- because new factors of increasing international tension have arisen -- and, on the other hand, that new prospects of understanding between the confronting parties have opened up. The danger has grown, and that fact cannot but be present at every moment in our debates. It has grown in comparison with the situation prevailing at the opening of the Conference on 14 March 1962. It has grown too, as compared with the state of affairs prevailing on 21 December 1962 at the conclusion of the third session of our Conference. Suffice it to recall the Nassau agreement, the plans to set up multilateral NATO nuclear forces, the conclusion of the military treaty between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the resumption by the United States Government of nuclear tests on 8 February -- four days prior to the reconvening of our Conference here -- and so on. To that one has to add the steps taken by the United States Government to encircle the socialist States with mobile bases comprising submarines equipped with nuclear weapons.

Those are dry facts; they are realities which, whatever representation or interpretation is given to them, cannot but lead to the conclusion that the danger of a nuclear war has grown. Consequently, on resuming our proceedings we must concentrate our efforts towards solving the problems concerning the possibilities of avoiding the outbreak of a nuclear war. The challenges facing us are multiple, but let us never forget that our primary task is to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Romanian delegation is convinced that this Committee will give due attention to that task and that we will move beyond the stage at which we recessed without having reached solutions when discussing items 5 (b) and 5 (c) (ENDC/1/Add.3 - ENDC/52).

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Concurrently with the working-out of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it is imperative for us to study the measures which would lead to the removal of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war -- measures which would lead to an international détente and which, as a matter of fact, form the prerequisites for disarmament. It is an undeniable truth that the existence on foreign territory of bases for means of delivery of nuclear weapons represents a factor of aggravation of the international situation and of increasing the danger of nuclear war. One does not need special knowledge of military and political matters in order to understand what a hotbed of anxiety, of endangering the security of the States concerned, of stirring up tension in international relations are the bases for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles sited on foreign territories. The Romanian delegation has repeatedly expressed its conviction that in the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament all foreign military bases must be abolished and all alien armed forces withdrawn from the territories of other States. We abide by that conviction entirely.

At the same time we welcome the initiative taken by the Soviet Government with regard to the adoption of a declaration providing for the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.<sup>1/</sup> The merits of that proposal are that out of the complexity of the problem of the liquidation of foreign military bases it highlights the aspect which is the most urgent and at the same time the easiest to solve. The implementation of the measures provided for in the draft declaration would undoubtedly facilitate, and to a significant extent, not only the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories but also the achievement of general and complete disarmament. In the view of the Romanian delegation the Committee ought to examine without any delay the draft declaration (ENDC/75) submitted by the Soviet delegation at the meeting of 12 February (ENDC/PV.96, p. 26).

Another outstanding problem on which the Committee has to focus its attention is the conclusion of a test ban treaty. The fact that the Soviet Government, in order to meet half-way the position of the Western Powers, has announced its agreement to the setting up of three automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory, (ENDC/PV.90 p. 15) as well as to the carrying out of two to three annual inspections on the

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<sup>1/</sup> ENDC/75

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

territory of each of the nuclear Powers, when it was considered necessary, (ENDC/73, p.5) has opened up new prospects for the achievement of an agreement on this matter. The Romanian delegation has repeatedly stressed the view that as far as the real needs of control over the implementation of the commitments deriving from a test ban treaty are concerned the national technical means are sufficient. The Soviet Union and the United States, in particular, possess an extensive network of national seismic stations which, as proved by experience, are of a nature to ensure the detection and identification of the events under discussion. If to those national means are added such supplementary elements of international control as are implied in the setting up of three automatic seismic stations and the carrying out, if necessary, of two or three on-site inspections, it is obvious that all objective conditions necessary for reaching agreement are fulfilled. I should say that, to use the words of an American diplomat and expert in disarmament, "To put the test ban into effect today requires little more than a stroke of the pen".

It is not my intention today to elaborate upon the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. I shall do that when the Committee devotes its debates to that subject. However, I cannot refrain from making some remarks and asking some questions.

Our Committee has devoted much time and energy to debating the question of the alleged necessity of on-site inspection in order to ascertain whether a state is carrying out underground nuclear tests. It appeared -- or at least that was what the representatives of the Western Powers let us understand -- that this would be the last obstacle in the way of an agreement. The controversy has been solved through the acceptance by the Soviet Government of two to three inspections a year, if necessary. While we expected that rapid steps would now be taken towards signing the agreement, the United States Government raised new objections which are likely to be as categorical as the ones concerning on-site inspection. So here we stand: once an obstacle has been removed we must immediately expect others to replace it, as in the story of Prince Charming and the Wicked King.



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

I think we are entitled to ask how long the list of objections and obstacles is going to be. Furthermore, the question unavoidably arises: what are we to think of the statement of the United States Government that it is ready to make every effort to reach agreement? Are we or are we not entitled to put face to face this statement -- which was repeated in the speech that the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, made on 12 February (ENDC/PV.96, pp.7 et seq.) to which we listened with all due attention -- and the move of the United States Government in resuming underground nuclear tests on 8 February, that is, on the very eve of the resumption of our work? These are not rhetorical questions. They are easily answered if the facts are analysed objectively and if logical conclusions are drawn, an action which will undoubtedly be undertaken by this Committee.

The Romanian delegation believes that other measures too, intended to ameliorate the international situation and consolidate peace, must be examined and adopted in this Committee. In this connexion we deem of great importance the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States participants in the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member States. It is easy to understand that the conclusion of such a pact would contribute to a significant extent to the amelioration of the international climate, to the promotion of trust between States and to the removal of the danger of war.

The Romanian delegation equally stands for the creation of nuclear-free zones in different areas of the globe -- in Central Europe, in Africa and in other areas. In this connexion I want to recall once more that the Romanian Government, which already in 1957 proposed that an understanding be reached between the Balkan States, continues to urge the turning of this area into a region of peace and co-operation, free of nuclear weapons, foreign military bases and launching pads. The Romanian delegation also favours other collateral measures.

In order to achieve success in our proceedings, in order to achieve an understanding, many conditions have to be fulfilled, among which tackling the issues in a constructive spirit, in a spirit of negotiation does not come last. Agreement on any international problem of our time becomes possible if the necessity of rational compromise is understood by one and all. But an agreement becomes impossible if one of the parties is lacking in that spirit -- if one of the parties does not take into account the interests of the other party.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

In the course of our debates the allegation has been voiced (ENDC/PV.96, p. 30) that the concessions made by the Soviet Government were concessions not to the other negotiating parties but to common sense. If the meaning of this assertion is that common sense requires that the parties make mutual concessions, that account must be taken of the interests of the partner in the negotiations, then we cannot but express the desire to see the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom follow the example of the Soviet Government and make concessions to common sense. However, if the words to which I am referring were intended to identify common sense with the positions of the Western Powers, thus implicitly asserting that all other positions contradict common sense, then we are faced with a method of approaching problems which is not likely to favour the success of the proceedings in our Conference.

In order to understand one another it is necessary to abandon the belief that one or the other party has monopolized common sense, reason and knowledge of realities. May I be allowed to recall here what Molière says somewhere in Les Femmes savantes:

"Nul n'aura de l'esprit

Hors nous et nos amis".

The proceedings of the Geneva Conference should draw inspiration from what Talleyrand once said:

"Il ya a quelqu'un qui a plus d'esprit que Voltaire, c'est tout le monde".

In our days tout le monde -- all mankind -- is represented by the will of hundreds of millions of people to live in peace and to work for the well-being of each and all.

As the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, stated on 29 December 1962:

"The entire development of international events proves the ardent necessity to militate tirelessly with all our strength in order to save the peoples from the catastrophe of a thermonuclear war.

"A realistic evaluation of the international situation proves that in our days the only alternative to a thermonuclear war is peaceful coexistence. This requires that all Governments and heads of States should evince a high spirit of responsibility, thoughtfulness and self-restraint in the tackling of international problems, give proof

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of patience and perseverance in order to solve all pending issues in any part of the world by way of negotiations and to respond in a spirit of understanding and wisdom to the paramount aspiration of the peoples concerning the establishment of a lasting peace. No matter how controversial the international issues may be, they can and they must be solved by mutually-acceptable peaceful solutions".

Implementing the instructions of its Government, the Romanian delegation intends to devote all its efforts to contributing to the achievement of an understanding on the issues facing our Committee and to support any constructive proposal intended to promote the cause of peace and friendship among peoples, the cause of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. de MELLO FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): I should like first to welcome Mr. Mikael Imru, representative of Ethiopia, and Mr. Foster, representative of the United States, who will, I am sure, make a very useful contribution to our work. I am also glad to see here Mr. Kuznetsov, who is now one of our co-Chairmen. Lastly, I should like to thank Mr. Cavaletti for his kind words about me yesterday.

The statements of the representatives of the nuclear Powers at the opening meeting of our resumed session provided no evidence of any new element likely to enlighten us on the prospects of the present negotiations. It is true that we cannot deny the existence of modifications, and even some progress, in the positions of the two principal Powers compared with their previous attitudes towards the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests. But we are sorry that we cannot find in that factual progress any sign of a genuine improvement in the tense political climate.

That remark may appear paradoxical, but we make it in all sincerity. We recognize that the gap between the two sides is slowly diminishing, but we are afraid that as it narrows it may also become deeper. The United States and Soviet representatives have shown us the extent and the value of the concessions each side has made to the other. But welcome though their statements were, the tone in which they were made seemed to indicate that the extreme limit of concessions had been reached on both sides. Nevertheless, the present residue of unsolved problems will, if it persists, make impossible the settlement of the whole question of nuclear tests which was recommended to us in such forthright terms by resolution 1762 (XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/63).

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If that is so, all measures of rapprochement accepted by the two parties will remain useless, and that is why, at the beginning of my statement, I said that the declarations of our co-Chairmen showed no prospect of real progress in the negotiations. But this rather disappointing observation can and must be qualified by another, more encouraging comment. We must also recognize that nothing that was said at the opening meeting indicated or tended to indicate any breakdown in the negotiations or even an open rejection of fresh efforts. The desire shown by both parties for the other side to take the initiative in making fresh concessions is accompanied by the expression, also on both sides, of the desire to achieve a satisfactory result. The explicit remarks made to that effect by Mr. Kuznetsov were confirmed by Mr. Foster's statements and by the solemn terms of the message addressed to the Conference by the President of the United States (ENDC/PV.96, pp. 8 et seq.).

As to Brazil's position - and I feel that our way of thinking does not differ very much from that of the other so-called non-aligned countries - we consider that the concrete points of disagreement are now really small and of little significance. I would even go so far as to say that the area of agreement between the two sides is very much broader than they are prepared to admit publicly. That is why we cannot readily accept a confession of failure. The interests of security so frequently invoked will be much better served, even from the national points of view of the great Powers, by the disarmament process, with its attendant risks, than by the continuation of the armaments race, whose dangers and disadvantages are probably much greater. At the same time there is nothing to indicate that the limit of concessions reached corresponds to the exhaustion of the technical possibilities of rapprochement between the two parties. Techniques are constantly improving, and the process of rapprochement which has been described to us has also taken place on the basis of increasingly satisfactory studies and safeguards. What is important, and I will go so far as to say essential, is to break the ice of mistrust, prejudice, fear and susceptibility.

I am sure that the eight non-aligned nations will do everything possible to bring about this thaw. Brazil, for its part, has conscientiously shouldered the share of responsibility assigned to it by the United Nations. Allow me to recall our positions as regards the question of nuclear tests, the consideration of which seems to us to have priority under resolution 1762 (XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly.

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During the last stage of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in December 1962, the written communication of the two co-Chairmen, Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Dean (ENDC/68) to the President of the General Assembly confined itself to the recognition of a deadlock on the problem of the nuclear test ban. The signatories of that communication expressed the hope, however, that the Conference might achieve agreement as a result of further efforts.

After the adjournment until 15 January, no optimism was entertained as to the prospects for our Conference's work on tests until the atmosphere was improved by the news that the United States and Soviet Union were proposing to postpone the resumption of the Conference in view of the desire of both those Powers to resume bilateral negotiations in order to overcome the difficulties facing the Committee. It was with a feeling of justifiable satisfaction that the Brazilian delegation, although realising the advantages of more intense activity by the Conference, agreed to its postponement in view of the reasons given.

We have always considered that, owing to the complexity of questions relating to disarmament - and particularly to nuclear disarmament - the practice of direct conversations between nuclear Powers was a very valuable factor in the progress of the negotiations. The relevant documents show, indeed, that such a practice fits in perfectly well with the whole pattern of recent events concerning disarmament.

Without going back to the period preceding the establishment of this organ of the United Nations, during which many examples of partial and limited agreements might be cited, it is hardly necessary to recall that our Conference is the outcome of a proposal submitted at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly by the United States and Soviet delegations. The hopes of the Brazilian delegation - and I think I may say of the delegations of all Governments concerned with the problem of disarmament - rose during the suspension of our work as a result of the publication of the letters exchanged between the Heads of Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, President Kennedy (ENDC/74) and Chairman Krushchev (ENDC/73).

The statements contained in those important historical documents could justify the most cautious reader in believing that at last there was a gleam of hope on the threatening horizon of international life. It was possible to think that, after the imminent and immediate danger provoked by the Cuban crisis in the United Nations and

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throughout the world, common sense would prevail over fear; that the sense of responsibility of the powerful States on which the fate of mankind depends would at last outweigh the narrow preoccupations of international supremacy and power; and that the possibilities of diplomatic negotiations so frequently evoked in a serene and constructive spirit, would lead to the elimination of the existing obstacles to final agreement on nuclear weapon tests, obstacles which of course are absurdly insignificant compared with the weight of the reasons which demand their removal. In his letter of 19 December, Chairman Krushchev rightly stated that "... the time has now come to put a stop to nuclear tests once and for all..." (ENDC/73, p.2) In the same document, we also read that the achievement of this result must be based on: "...complete equality and due consideration for each other's interests..." (ibid.) and that "we must resolve all controversial questions by means of negotiations and mutual concessions." (ibid.). I draw particular attention to the last expression in the paragraph, "mutual concessions".

In his reply of 28 December, President Kennedy says:

"There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age" (ENDC/74, p.1)

and further:

"If we are to have peace between systems with far-reaching ideological differences, we must find ways for reducing or removing the recurring waves of fear and suspicion which feed on ignorance, misunderstanding or what appear to one side or the other as broken agreements." (ibid.)

In the same document, the President says:

"I do not believe that any of the problems which I have raised are insoluble, but they ought to be solved." (ibid. p.3)

I think that last paragraph is also worth stressing.

The delegation of Brazil, on behalf of the Brazilian Government, feels it must state its position here in order that our intentions and the efforts we are honestly making for nuclear disarmament may be placed on record and may be better understood by Brazilian and international public opinion. That is why I should like to recapitulate the statements made and the action taken by Brazil in this connexion.

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In the speech in which, as Brazilian representative, I opened the general debate at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 1961, I stressed the fragility of a guarantee based on the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests, and I said: "Brazil ... urges immediate negotiations with a view to ... consolidating the de facto truce through the conclusion of a treaty." (A/PV.1011, para.31)

We have always been aware of the inherent difficulties in drawing up a definitive treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests for military purposes in all environments in which such tests can be carried out. That is why the Brazilian Government has always considered that the idea of a total ban might be realized by means of partial measures of different kinds. Thus we have consistently supported any suggestions or measures designed to secure partial results, such as treaties on regional denuclearization, treaties concerning the cessation, even limited, of certain types of test, or again, temporary suspension agreements based on informal decisions designed to gain time and create favourable conditions for more detailed negotiations.

The immediate cessation of tests was called for by Brazil in a statement which I made in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 1 November 1961 (A/C.1/SR.1183, par.24), in the speech made at this Conference on 16 March 1962 by Mr. San Thiago Dantas, (ENDC/PV.3, pp.5 et seq.) former Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Mr. Araujo Castro's speech in this Committee on 16 July 1962, (ENDC/PV.57, p. 43) in another statement by Mr. Araujo Castro on 6 August, in which he expressly called for a "nuclear cease-fire" (ENDC/PV.66, p. 49), in my own speech of 1 November 1962 in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/SR.1262, pp.4 et seq.) in Mr. Assumpção de Araujo's speech at this Conference on 20 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.95, pp. 37 et seq.) and lastly in the protests that we have never failed to make whenever the United States or the Soviet Union declared or carried out their intention to start a new series of tests. The idea that we should provisionally accept partial solutions which might serve as steps on the road to the achievement of a final and general agreement has also been frequently formulated and supported by the Brazilian representatives.

In his above-mentioned speech of 16 March 1962, Mr. San Thiago Dantas formally supported the immediate suspension of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space, in respect of which there was no difference of opinion concerning control. Similar statements were contained in Mr. Araujo Castro's speeches in this Committee on 25 July (ENDC/PV.61, pp. 33 et seq.), 6 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.66, p.49) and 17 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.71, pp. 14 et seq.), and also in the statement I made in the First Committee of the General Assembly in New York on 1 November 1962 (A/C.1/SR.1262, pp.4 et seq.).

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The Brazilian delegation also tried to find a partial and progressive solution to the problem of underground tests by considering the idea, later discussed at the Pugwash Scientific Conference, of diminishing limits beyond which the detection of underground tests would not be necessary, in order to reduce by degrees the margin of disagreement on control.

We have also shown our sympathy for another form of partial solution, that of denuclearized zones. In November 1961, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, we unreservedly supported the proposal for the denuclearization of Africa (A/4942/Add.3). In March 1962, Mr. San Thiago Dantas, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalled the precedent set by the Antarctic Treaty of 26 December 1959 and said that "such measures gave expression to the refusal to legitimize the use of arms of mass destruction." (ENDC/PV.3, p.8).

I myself, opening the general debate at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September 1962, said:

"Brazil is also favourable in principle to the establishment of denuclearized areas on our planet ... Latin America could well be one of these denuclearized areas." (A/PV.1125, p.12)

After that statement the Brazilian delegation, with the support of the representatives of Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador, submitted a proposal providing for the denuclearization of Latin America. (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2). We had the satisfaction of obtaining from the outset many spontaneous declarations of support for this proposal, including those of the chief United States and Soviet representatives. Unfortunately, however, the immediate consequences of the Cuban crisis - and above all the Cuban Government's refusal to accept any sort of reciprocal multilateral inspection, as envisaged in such a treaty - compelled the Brazilian Government to request the postponement of the vote until the next General Assembly, when we shall bring up our proposal again. Incidentally, if it seems desirable, we shall submit the question to this Conference when the treaty on general and complete disarmament comes up for discussion.

I should like to draw the Conference's attention to another point, that of Brazil's firm position in regard to the problem of effective international control over the process of general disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests. In long statements during the first stage of this Conference, I indicated on two



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occasions my Government's point of view regarding problems of control, and expressed the opinion that they mainly depended on an easing of the international situation which might lead to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence. I stressed the fact that Brazil had no rigid views on methods of control, and consequently considered that such a subject was one to be settled by the principal nuclear Powers. However, we have always urged these great Powers to engage in genuine negotiations and not in mere discussions without any intention to negotiate.

The most important contribution so far made to the solution of the problem of control is no doubt, as indeed the representatives of the two opposing blocs have themselves recognized, the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/28). The Brazilian delegation co-operated to the best of its ability with its distinguished colleagues of the eight non-aligned nations in the drafting of this document. Even before its submission, when it was still in its original form of a suggestion by the Swedish delegation, we gave it our full support. In my speech of 3 April 1962 I referred to the Swedish initiative, which later became the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, and I stressed:

"... the possibility of resuming negotiations, which would obviously call for flexibility on both sides, that is to say the possibility of the socialist countries accepting the principle of international control and the possibility of the Western Powers accepting the fact that international control is not confined to the form of control which they consider effective."

(ENDC/PV.14, p.45)

In regard to the execution of control, the Brazilian Government has always urged the need for technical studies to be undertaken concurrently with political discussions, perhaps through some specialist body set up for the purpose. The problem of the technical study of control has been fully discussed by us, and in this connexion, I may mention my speech of 28 November 1961 in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/SR.1204, para. 3) my statement of 18 May 1962 at this Conference, followed by the proposal to set up a technical body (ENDC/PV.39, pp.11 et seq.) and Mr. San Thiago Dantas' speech of 16 March 1962 (ENDC/PV.3, pp.5 et seq.). The Brazilian suggestion to set up a technical body met with support from the delegations of Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada, and so far we remain unconvinced by the arguments opposing this idea, which incidentally

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is not ours alone. The Swedish representatives particularly urged this approach to the question. Admittedly, some of the conclusions of the recent Pugwash Conference have been regarded with some scepticism on the ground that its members had no standing as official representatives. True enough, but that is a political objection which has no relevance whatever to the technical competence of the specialists who took part in that technico-scientific meeting and whose opinions carry great weight in all that concerns the scientific approach to the question.

Furthermore the delegation of Brazil unreservedly supported General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII), which has a direct bearing on our work. In fact we did more than merely support it, since we participated directly in the preparation of the document, which to a certain extent was due to our initiative. In my statement in the general debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1125 (provisional), p.12), I announced the Brazilian Government's intention to submit the draft, whose general outline, including support for the eight-nation Memorandum and priority for the problem of the tests, was accepted to our great satisfaction by the other sponsors of the draft resolution.

I note in passing that in the same statement the representative of Brazil suggested that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France should meet in New York, "in order to eliminate the differences which separate us from our final goal, which is the prohibition of all nuclear tests" (ibid.). Of course it was not as a result of this idea - I have no illusions on that point - that the representatives of the three nuclear Powers attending our Conference recently met in New York and Washington. We simply wish to indicate the importance that we have long attached to such high-level contacts, on which the success of our work largely depends. It seems to us of prime importance - and here I endorse what was said yesterday by our distinguished colleague the Canadian representative (ENDC/PV.97, pp.18 et seq.) - that such conversation between nuclear Powers should continue unremittingly in the Sub-Committee and between the co-Chairmen until new areas of agreement are discovered.

(Mr. de Mello Franco, Brazil)

The widening of these areas of agreement depends on both technical and political factors. The technical part is designed to clarify the still unresolved questions relating to the verification of the cessation of tests, both by means of automatic seismic stations, or "black boxes" as they are called, and on-site inspections. It seems to us difficult for the group of eight non-aligned Powers to make a decisive contribution to the clarification of these doubtful and controversial questions, which should preferably be studied by specialized technical methods.

As to the political factors, their settlement depends only on the will of the great Powers to do what they say they want to do - that is, to negotiate in a genuine spirit of understanding and confidence, since the facts show, as President Kennedy acknowledged in his letter, (ENDC/74, p.3) that present problems are not insoluble and ought to be solved.

It is in this political field that the action of the eight nations may make itself felt with most effect. We do not form either an ideological bloc or a third political force, but simply a diplomatic group bearing a mandate from the United Nations and conscious of the high moral responsibility inherent in such a mandate. It is to honour this moral responsibility that the Brazilian delegation intends to make every effort to promote that progress in the negotiations which we all feel is still possible. But, on the other hand, we can not conceal our disappointment and even our doubts as regards the usefulness of continuing a task which would become futile should the intransigence of one side or the other destroy all hope.

The Brazilian delegation duly appreciated the suggestions contained in Mr. Kuznetsov's speech concerning an agreement on extremely important points, although they bear no direct relation to the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.96, pp.15 et seq.). Among those matters, two deserve the immediate and explicit support of the Brazilian delegation: first, the non-aggression pact between the members of the Warsaw Treaty and those of the North Atlantic Treaty; and secondly the establishment of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world. In that connexion our Czechoslovak colleague, Mr. Kurka, at yesterday's meeting, made some extremely interesting remarks and referred especially to the Brazilian proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America (ENDC/PV.97, pp.4 et seq.).

(Mr. de Mello Franco, Brazil)

However, the Brazilian delegation also believes that the fact that the Conference is dealing with important problems in connexion with the treaty on general disarmament in no way means that it is neglecting the crucial problem of nuclear tests which, according to resolution 1762 (XVII), must be the principal subject of our meeting. Here we are in full agreement with the prudent and enlightened remarks made here by Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico, on 12 February last (ENDC/PV.96, pp.5 et seq.), and also at our meeting yesterday by Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy (ENDC/PV.97, pp.13 et seq.), and Mr. Burns, representative of Canada (ibid. pp.18 et seq.). We have, in fact, for some time believed, as I tried to show just now, that the three nuclear Powers must, through their delegations, keep in direct contact with a view to lessening and, if possible, removing the remaining difficulties in connexion with the problem of the tests, in order that the limit of the concessions already reached may be extended still further by both parties. This is an indispensable condition for the conclusion of an agreement and is implicit in the statements contained in the letters of the two Heads of State which I mentioned just now.

Disarmament is a long-term process which will last for years, perhaps for the whole of our generation. But the halting of the armaments race is something else, and may be achieved in a much shorter time, perhaps even in a few months, and the banning of nuclear weapon tests is an essential element in the halting of the armaments race.

In this connexion, I think that the eight non-aligned nations may do useful work in submitting suggestions for improving and bringing up to date our memorandum of last year (ENDC/28). I am sure that the countries which have participated for a relatively short time in these negotiations will gladly undertake such a responsibility, and the Brazilian delegation will always be ready to make every effort and give all the co-operation of which it is capable.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): After a recess of almost two months the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work in conditions which unfortunately do not justify exaggerated optimism. To be convinced of this, there is little need to refer to all the important events in the development of the international situation. It is quite sufficient to enumerate

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

the most important events of the arms race: the Nassau Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for delivery to the latter of Polaris submarines; the plan for creating a multilateral NATO nuclear force; the efforts of the United States to place American nuclear weapons in Canada; the resumption of underground nuclear tests by the United States; the journey of the United States Under-Secretary for Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, to negotiate arrangements with certain countries for the basing of American submarines equipped with Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads, and so on.

This is quite enough to convey a clear idea of the immediate effect these developments might have on our Conference's work during its present session. We do not think that the mere enumeration of these facts can be interpreted as an attempt to introduce polemics into our discussions, or to poison the atmosphere of our negotiations. Facts are facts, and if we wish to reach a positive result we must display them clearly; we must also clearly enunciate the obstacles and attempt to eliminate them in a frank and fair exchange of views.

In order to reach a mutually-acceptable agreement on the different questions on the Conference agenda, and above all on the major question of general and complete disarmament, we must indubitably examine all the possibilities of mutual concession on the questions to be settled. This is necessary in all discussions and all negotiations, and above all in negotiations on questions vital for the various countries. Indeed, this fact was emphasized by the representatives of the Western Powers in the statements they made on the day the Conference resumed its work (ENDC/PV.96).

The United States representative, Mr. Foster, attempted to give the impression - it is true that he was speaking on a much more restricted subject, that of nuclear tests - that the United States had adopted a flexible position, whereas the Soviet Union's attitude on Disarmament questions was "take it or leave it" (*ibid.*, p.14). However, the facts are quite different. The Soviet Union has made constant efforts to reach agreement, and has made important concessions not only on general and complete disarmament but also on the cessation of nuclear tests.

In fact the Soviet Union, after introducing on 19 March 1962 its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) - which, if it had been accepted in full, could have led to rapid disarmament and, above all, eliminated in the first stage the nuclear threat to humanity -, made several amendments to that draft

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

in order to meet certain objections raised by the Western Powers, and made important concessions to the West while retaining the general framework of its draft on general and complete disarmament.

In chronological order these concessions to the Western Powers have been as follows:

1. Agreement to a 30% reduction in conventional armaments during the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.10);
2. A reduction of military forces during the first stage to 1,900,000 men for the Soviet Union and the United States instead of the 1,700,000 of the original Soviet draft (*ibid.*);
3. The implementation of the total disarmament programme over a period of five years instead of four years (*ibid.*, p.2), so that the first stage could be extended to 24 months (*ibid.*, p.15) instead of the 15 months proposed in the Soviet draft;
4. Agreement to certain measures proposed by the Western Powers for reduction of the danger of war by mistake, accident or misinterpretation (ENDC/48);
5. The proposal to entitle the United States and the Soviet Union to retain an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles until the end of the second stage, whereas all other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be eliminated during the first stage. (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5, art.5, para.1).

All these concessions show that the position of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries is conciliatory and constructive. 1

At the same time the Western Powers' attitude, although certain Western representatives have called it flexible and conciliatory, has in fact been to adhere to the old positions which they occupied at the beginning of the negotiations for general and complete disarmament. All they have done has been to present new versions of their old positions. That is the first point that should be made clear if our Committee is to pursue its work successfully.

Another question on which the positions and possibilities for agreement should be clarified is the prohibition and cessation of all nuclear tests. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries defined their position on this question a long time ago. In the present state of modern science it is unnecessary to organize an international control system in order to supervise the application of

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. National means of detection and identification are fully satisfactory for the performance of this task.

However, those countries accepted the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States on this question (ENDC/28). Again considering the Western positions, the Soviet Union has accepted - where they are absolutely necessary - two or three inspections a year on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers (ENDC/73, p.5). This important concession by the Soviet Union has been greeted by world opinion and by the countries concerned with reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests as a decisive contribution. Moreover, this point of view has been shared by almost all the speakers here. Yesterday the Italian representative described this concession as an "effort of good will made by the Soviet Government to come closer to our views" (ENDC/PV.97, p.16); and he then expressed the greatest satisfaction.

However, here also the Western Powers have so far shown themselves intransigent and indeed recalcitrant. So far from taking any decisive step from their side to meet the Soviet Union halfway in its efforts to achieve an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, they lay new conditions and make new demands. In the past, when the Western nuclear Powers had to face strong pressure from world opinion, some of their representatives declared that they would accept a very small number of on-site inspections in order to conclude a "general and complete" treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. For example, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, asked the Soviet representative in his statement of 3 December 1962, speaking of a test period:

"Does the representative of the Soviet Union really tell us that those two, three or four on-site inspections in six months would make any difference to Soviet security arrangements?" (ENDC/PV.86, page 49)

On the other hand, Sir Michael Wright, the other United Kingdom representative, declared in his statement of 5 December - that is two days later:

"But what I am saying is that, if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963." (ENDC/PV.87, page 8).

(He meant, of course, a general and complete treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests.)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It would be of value to recall to the members of the Conference that the Soviet position to which Sir Michael Wright referred in his statement was acceptance by the Soviet Union of three inspections per year. This, therefore, is what the United Kingdom representatives were demanding during our Committee's last session in order to achieve a complete treaty on nuclear tests. Now, however, that the Soviet Union has accepted the demands the United Kingdom representatives made in their previous statements, Mr. Godber declares in his statement of 12 February, just at the resumption of our work;

"The Soviet Union has offered three on-site inspections. The position of the Western Powers is that we have agreed to eight to ten such inspections. The Western figure is of course a reduction on anything we have previously put forward"

(although really, as you see, it is an increase)

"and is an indication of our desire to reach agreement and of our determination to make use of every piece of the latest scientific information available which enables us to cut down the number of unidentified events." (ENDC/PV.96, p.31)

One might well ask at what point the United Kingdom representatives are basing their proposals on scientific fact - when they speak of three inspections a year, or when they speak of eight or ten? Should one conclude that the scientific bases for the proposals of certain Western Powers likewise change with the political needs of the moment?

The intransigent positions taken up by the Western delegations in the face of the new Soviet proposals have created a new impasse in the negotiations on nuclear tests. The only way out of this situation, which threatens to become tragic, is for the Western Powers, primarily the United States, to prove their good will by taking a decisive step to meet the Soviet position on this question of the number of on-site inspections.

We should like to hope that President Kennedy's statements in his message to the Conference on the resumption of its work, and also Mr. Foster's own speech, can be taken to point in this direction. Indeed, the President of the United States declares in his message



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"We look with hope to the work which begins in Geneva ...",  
and further

"The prospects of agreement on a test ban treaty now seem somewhat  
more encouraging than before ..." ENDC/PV.96, p.8).

This note of optimism was echoed by Mr. Foster when he said:

"I believe that there is some reason to hope that a test ban agreement  
may be on the way ...". (ibid., p.9).

Later in his statement Mr. Foster declared:

"I think it would promote progress in these talks if we could all secure  
a more or less common understanding of the kind of verification which  
is now the subject of negotiations". (ibid., p.10)

Still later he continues:

"It is a fact which has been obscured by debate over numbers: it is  
a fact, nonetheless," (this concerns the conception of inspection)  
"which is far broader than the present much-publicized inspection quota  
controversy". (ibid.)

I repeat:

"... than the present much-publicized inspection quota controversy".

I ask your pardon for overloading this survey with quotations, but I think  
it is important to understand what is behind the thinking of those who have made  
these statements. What emerges from the quotations I have just made is that  
the important thing is not necessarily the number of inspections but the idea of  
inspection, and this should not be obscured by numbers. Should we understand  
from these statements by the representative of the United States that his country  
would be prepared to take a decisive step and agree with the Soviet Union on  
the number of annual inspections considered indispensable - that is to say two  
or three inspections - if the two sides could agree later on the actual concept  
of inspection? Or do they wish to make the formulation of a common concept of  
on-site inspections a condition precedent to agreement with the Soviet Union on  
the number of inspections?

At all events it is well known that, in negotiations between sovereign and  
independent States, it is not only futile but even prejudicial to success to  
lay down conditions precedent. No conditions precedent, especially if it concerns  
technical details or technicalities, however important they may seem to one party,  
can contribute to agreement or to solution of the problem under discussion.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is therefore necessary that the United States and the other Western Powers who possess nuclear arms should take the indispensable step of agreeing with the Soviet Union on the number of inspections, so that the discussion may be extended later to methods and a common concept of on-site inspections, all of which will be absolutely necessary when a definite agreement comes to be signed. In this work we are sure that they will be helped and supported by all other countries, and especially by the representatives of the non-aligned countries sitting in our Committee, who as you know presented their memorandum (ENDC/28) to facilitate our Committee's work.

It was perhaps because our colleague the representative of Italy had these possibilities in mind and was fully aware of the situation that he emphasized in his statement yesterday: "I consider that we now have all the essential foundations for the successful conclusion of our talks, ..." (ENDC/PV.97, p.16). May the hopes and wishes expressed here by the representatives of the Western Powers come true! All eyes are now fixed on the Western Powers and their representatives assembled here, waiting for them to take the decisive step which will lead to a treaty finally prohibiting all nuclear tests. Now it is the Western Powers' turn to speak. It is upon them that the success of our work at this stage depends so far as the cessation of nuclear tests is concerned.

When we resumed our work the delegation of the Soviet Union placed before us a draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). In view of recent events this proposal for the dismantling of bases for submarines carrying nuclear weapons, of permanent bases with long-range nuclear installations, and the like, would allow humanity to see the future in a better light. It would create conditions in which confidence between States could grow stronger, and would ensure success in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

We therefore cannot understand the United Kingdom representative's total opposition to this proposal when it was introduced:

"Therefore to dramatize the question of foreign bases has never seemed to me to be helpful to us in our task ...". (ENDC/PV.96, p.29).

This is what he actually said immediately after the proposal had been presented by the representative of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The President of the United States, however, held a different view when he declared on 22 October:

(continued in English)

"We no longer live in a world where only the active firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace." (New York Times, 23 October 1962)

(continued in French)

However, in spite of these statements the United States is now in fact covering the world with its military bases equipped with long-range nuclear weapon vehicles. It has started to re-organize and change the structure of its bases by sending its Polaris submarines close to the frontiers of the countries which it considers its potential enemies. Must we believe that nuclear weapon vehicles close to the United States are more dangerous than those right on the frontiers of the countries which it thinks might become its enemies?

To justify this opposition to the Soviet Union proposal, the West repeats the old arguments, which have been refuted time and again, about alleged difference of geographical situation, distance, and so on. Although this reasoning, these arguments, are outworn and have long been invalidated by technical development, they are still persistently repeated here by the exponents of military bases on foreign territory - when these are directed against other countries. There has been some talk recently of sending nuclear Polaris submarines into the Mediterranean. Our country, which is near the Mediterranean, is concerned lest such submarines should disturb the peace and security of peoples in this region of the world. This is why we are specially anxious that the Soviet Union proposal on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) should be discussed urgently and with all the attention it deserves. A final text should be drafted as soon as possible to end the danger of armed conflict between nuclear Powers. This would without doubt contribute enormously to creation of the most favourable conditions for solution of the major problem before our Conference, that of general and complete disarmament. We may deal with this important question in greater detail when the Soviet Union proposal is specifically debated at a future meeting.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

A number of views have been expressed here by various representatives during our last two meetings. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that our Conference ought to concentrate on measures collateral to general and complete disarmament, such as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, elimination of the danger of war through miscalculation, accident or erroneous assessment, and other questions. It has been emphasized that the conclusion of an agreement on some of these measures would create an atmosphere of confidence which would contribute to the fulfilment of our principal task, general and complete disarmament. That is the setting in which we should view these problems and strive to reach agreement. The Bulgarian delegation will do its utmost to contribute to the common effort which we hope will be made in this Committee to reach positive results on these questions which will open the way to the solution of the major task entrusted to this Conference: the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming to our midst two new heads of delegations: Mr. Imru of Ethiopia, and Mr. William Foster of the United States, whose efforts will, I am sure, contribute to the clarification and solution of the problems before us. I am also very pleased to see here again our old friends Mr. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. de Mello Franco, Ambassador and Senator of Brazil, and other representatives who have rejoined us after a brief vacation during which they have not headed their delegations.

Mr. LBU (Nigeria): My delegation has great pleasure in welcoming to this Committee the leaders of the United States and Ethiopian delegations. We certainly look forward to their worthy contributions to our work. Mr. Dean will be missed by all his friends in this Conference. We were delighted to learn from Mr. Foster on Tuesday that, even though personal circumstances have made it impossible for Mr. Dean to continue his work here, he still retains an active interest in this field as a consultant to the United States Government. When the history of our exercises here is written Mr. Dean will be fondly remembered, among other things, as the originator of many familiar phrases and words in this Conference, such as "discussion in depth", "workmanlike", "specificity", and so on. Perhaps Mr. Dean will best be remembered as the representative who listened with the greatest interest to anything said in this Conference. We sincerely wish him well in his new life.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

At our meeting of 10 December 1962 I submitted on behalf of my delegation (ENDC/PV.90, p.13) that it would not be demanding too much if we called upon "the two Ks" to use the Cuban formula to reach agreement on nuclear weapon tests. The recent exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy on a nuclear test ban and the subsequent meetings in Washington and New York between representatives of the two sides on the same issue of nuclear tests have indeed vindicated the Nigerian submission. One thing above all has emerged from this exchange of letters and that is the symmetry of views between "the two Ks". Thus, President Kennedy has this to say in the opening paragraph of his reply to Chairman Khrushchev's letter:

"I was very glad to receive your letter of December 19, 1962, setting forth your views on nuclear tests. There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only those who have the responsibility for controlling these weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use would bring". (ENDC/74, p.1)

Those words are weighty. A stage has now been reached where mere declarations of intention are patently inadequate. We need a positive measure of success in our efforts. This is the opportune moment. The uncharted field of our manoeuvres is closing fast against us. Let us clinch victory in order to avoid an inevitable collision. We have no reason to wait for a final nuclear holocaust, which could cause unimaginable consequences to humanity and damage to our genetic heritage, before we are forced to agree on a test ban. Then it would be too late, and nothing would matter any more.

We are indeed within an ace of achieving agreement, with acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle and inevitability of on-site inspection for the detection and identification of suspicious explosions. We are indeed grateful for what has been achieved so far; but our genuine gratitude would know no bounds at the signing of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. We must endeavour not to allow victory to elude us during this current session. What is required of the two sides now is statesmanlike courage to complete the job. For the sake of posterity let them be guided to do the right thing and spare mankind the agonizing thought of a thermonuclear war. If I may quote from

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

William J. Winkler's "Good, Better, Best", the hope of the world, the scientific rational approach to meet the urgency of a test ban, requires that "the two Ks" redouble their efforts to do

"Good, better, best,  
Never letting it rest  
Until their good is better  
And their better best."

It may well be true that in a conference like ours the means may never justify the end. If so, let us try to examine whether the end will in fact justify the means.

There are a number of positive measures which will undoubtedly bring us nearer to our goal. We are happy, therefore, to have resumed our work here in an improved international atmosphere. It is a duty incumbent upon us to seize this propitious opportunity to record some measure of agreement in the enormous task confronting us. The world at large is following our deliberations here with meticulous interest and is astounded at the absence of any substantial agreement. My delegation has noted with interest that the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom dealt with certain collateral matters on which agreement could be reached without prejudice to our main task of general and complete disarmament. Whilst we strive relentlessly towards our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, we should equally explore the prospects of reaching agreement on limited measures which would lessen international tension, facilitate our task and enable mankind to taste the first fruits of disarmament.

In a statement read to us on Tuesday by Mr. Foster, President Kennedy is credited with having said, among other things:

"The United States also believes that measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications should be pressed with energy." (ENDC/PV.96, p.8)

My delegation sincerely trusts that sufficient attention will be given to these collateral measures during the course of our work at this session. The relief of humanity would be immense if adequate steps were taken to prevent war by accident, through miscalculation or failure of communications, or if a non-aggression pact were concluded between the two giant military blocs - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact - or if the most significant of human endeavours,

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

the conquest of outer space, were reserved for peaceful purposes only, or if the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be halted. My delegation has consistently supported the principle of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. Thus on 20 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.95, pp.59-60) my delegation strongly supported the resolution (1652 (XVI)) unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1961 concerning the recognition of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

I have compelling reasons for re-stating our support for that United Nations resolution. During the current United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, which is holding its meetings in this Palais des Nations, fear has been expressed of water poisoning by nuclear tests. Academician G.V. Bogomolov, a professor of geology from Byelorussia, is reported to have said that "Decisive struggles should be waged against underground bomb tests in deserts and burial of radioactive wastes". Professor Bogomolov claimed that a number of underdeveloped arid areas, particularly in North Africa, were dependent on water from huge underground lakes lying beneath deserts. Contamination of one area could diffuse through the lake and affect far-distant areas. These facts were unknown to me and my delegation when I spoke at our ninety-fifth meeting.

Our concern over the explosion of atomic devices in Africa can effectively be met by our reaching an immediate agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests. My delegation has at all times maintained that it is pointless talking about disarmament unless an effective stop is put to the perfection of these diabolical weapons of mass annihilation and naked aggression against humanity.

It is gratifying to observe that the two sides are indeed very close to reaching agreement on a test ban. The fact that the Soviet Union has accepted inspection in loco is a clear indication of its willingness to reach agreement. Equally important is the fact that the United States from all accounts now no longer insists that national seismic stations for purposes of detection of suspicious explosions need be nationally manned and internationally supervised. These are major steps taken by the two sides towards finding a solution to our problem.

The only remaining difference now between the two is quantitative rather than qualitative. The number of on-site inspections now appears to be the only stumbling-block. Is this last difference in fact insuperable? My answer

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

is "No", if more understanding and flexibility rather than rigidity are shown by our two co-Chairmen. When I spoke on 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90, p11) I made the point that all international treaties are based on good faith. I still maintain that there can be no watertight guarantees against infraction of any agreement, international or otherwise. Let us take full cognizance once again of that ancient maxim: "Pacta sunt servanda". If we believe in this maxim, then our treaty on a nuclear test ban will have more than a reasonable chance of success.

Warfare in the nuclear age appears to put a premium, however illusory, on the strategy of the first crippling blow. In a world society which has reached the penultimate state in the process of the concentration of power and in which, therefore, any major war must become a struggle for world domination, each side is likely to put survival and mastery over the rest of the world before any other consideration. In this eventuality, any form of legal restraint on the ground of reprisals will hardly be of a calibre commensurate with our problem. Therefore, if the only other choice which is offered to our generation is indefinite co-existence under fear of co-extinction, a nuclear armaments race of gigantic proportions and gradual pollution of the air, water and soil, nothing can be more vital than to think of constructive alternatives, however great the sacrifice in attaining them.

These alternatives to co-extinction of the human race are, first, agreement on a nuclear test ban and, second, agreement on general and complete disarmament. What has been achieved so far on a nuclear test ban is somewhat negative. We appeal to the nuclear Powers to accept their responsibility to create in 1963 an oasis of peace and thereby eliminate tension everywhere in the world.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At its three plenary meetings the Committee has heard statements by a number of delegations on a wide range of disarmament problems. In these statements, the speakers assessed the conditions in which disarmament negotiations are being resumed, expressed views on how the negotiations should be carried on in future and put forward some considerations regarding specific disarmament problems.



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The statements of the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania are imbued with the desire to make a useful contribution to the solution of the problems before the Committee. The interesting considerations put forward by the representatives of Brazil and Nigeria are also worthy of attention. We shall study all the statements carefully.

In the first place it is noticeable that most of the statements reflect the increasing alarm of the peoples at the situation which is now being created in the world as a result of the dangerous activities of the Western Powers aimed at further accelerating the rate of the nuclear arms race. The situation is indeed alarming, as we had occasion to mention in our statement at the meeting on 12 February (ENDC/PV.96, pp.15 et seq.). One cannot but agree with the words of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padillo Nervo, the chairman of the first meeting, when he said:

"Hostile events are increasing, and new crises can lead us once again to the brink of war.

"The world views with alarm the rate of growth of both thermonuclear and conventional armaments, which is being increased with the declared purpose of creating deterrents capable of preventing a nuclear holocaust ... In every country cool-headed, shrewd thinkers are anxiously wondering whether the deterrent factors which are daily increasing in destructive capacity can have a real and permanent deterrent effect." (ibid., pp.6,7).

It is true that some representatives in the Committee tried to argue against the general opinion regarding the danger of the situation which is now coming about in the world as a result of the intensification of the armaments race. Thus, the United Kingdom representative tried in his statement to make out that nothing alarming was in fact happening in the world and that the Western Powers were were not taking any action which might have dangerous consequences or, in particular, might lead to a wider spread of nuclear weapons. He argued here that even the plan for the creation of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force was in no way aimed at the further spread of nuclear weapons. He said:

".... any country within the NATO alliance which is not at the present time a nuclear Power will not obtain control of nuclear weapons. I say that emphatically ...." (ibid., p.28).

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

It seems, however, that Mr. Godber's device, with which we are all familiar, namely, trying to confuse the issue by a play on words, is of no avail in this case. If the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force will not change anything in the existing situation, as the speaker tried to make out, then, we would ask, why has all this fuss been started? Whom do you want to mislead - us or your partners in NATO? But for some reason your partners in NATO, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, which is avidly reaching out its hands for nuclear weapons, are trying to bring about the quickest possible implementation of the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force. As for the Hitlerite generals who are now serving in the Bundeswehr and are playing a considerable part in NATO, they have quite fine enough a flair to determine accurately what this multilateral nuclear force smacks of. So I would ask you, Mr. Godber, not to take the members of the Committee for naive people.

Let us look at things realistically. Whatever statements like the one I have just quoted may be made by the representatives of States members of NATO, we cannot escape the fact, which has been widely publicized in the West, that the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force provides for the manning of atomic submarines carrying Polaris missiles by crews made up of nationals of States members of NATO which do not possess nuclear weapons, and for the future transfer of full control over these submarines to NATO Powers which are at present non-nuclear.

At the present time a great many people, even in the West, realize what the authors of the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force are driving at. Is it not evident, for instance, from the statement in the New York Times of 21 January 1963 that the final phase of the creation of a multilateral nuclear force:

"...would see the submarines turned completely over to NATO's multi-national control. The United States would no longer retain both keys or the veto power over atomic warheads."

That this was not a chance statement is shown by the fact that, ten days later, on 31 January, in an editorial entitled "Missiles in the Mediterranean" the New York Times again pointed out that the final stage "would turn over full control of the submarines, the missiles and their nuclear warheads to NATO", and that that would involve a change in the United States atomic energy law, which prohibits the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to any other country.

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These statements have not been refuted, and it is therefore all the more strange to hear Mr. Godber's "emphatic" assertion that the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force does not provide for access to nuclear weapons for NATO Powers, including Western Germany, which do not now possess nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, all this shows that this plan is aimed precisely at a further spreading of nuclear weapons, with all the dangerous consequences entailed thereby. Such actions obviously cannot help towards bringing about a favourable atmosphere for the solution of disarmament problems.

It should also be borne in mind that the Western Powers have recently prepared other plans providing for the further spread of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, we have already referred to the military treaty between France and Western Germany. As is well known, this treaty directly provides for collaboration between France and Western Germany in all spheres of the armaments race, and no exception is stipulated for nuclear weapons. Moreover, the President of the French Republic deemed it necessary to add that Western Germany itself is entitled to decide upon the weapons with which it wishes to equip its armed forces. Taking into consideration the fact that the representative of France is ignoring the work of our Committee, it seems to be clear what aim is being pursued by the military treaty between France and Western Germany.

Those are the facts. They show that the policy of the Western Powers is to intensify the nuclear armaments race, and they arouse among the peoples a justifiable alarm, which has been echoed in the statements of most delegations in this Committee. Only those who are in favour of the armaments race, in order to carry on a policy "from a position of strength", can regard the existing situation as normal and fail to show anxiety for the cause of the maintenance of peace.

Many representatives have spoken here of the need to put an end to the nuclear arms race, to eliminate the threat of war and to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament as rapidly as possible. As we understand it, the majority of the delegations are anxious to carry on and make more productive our negotiations on this vital problem, the solution of which is the Committee's main task. We should like to hope that we will indeed succeed in moving forward the negotiations

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on general and complete disarmament and in passing from the stage of the "war of single and double brackets", in which the opposing views of the sides are enclosed, to reaching agreement on specific provisions of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and to working out mutually acceptable solutions of specific problems. That is what the Soviet Union is sincerely striving for.

We cannot, however, overlook certain statements made in the course of the discussions in the Committee which reflect the old line of the Western Powers, aimed at using the negotiations on general and complete disarmament not for seeking agreement, but as a screen for continuing the armaments race. In this connexion, I must once again refer to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on 12 February (ENDC/PV.96, pp.25 et seq.). Through this whole statement there ran a single idea - it might well be a good thing to reach an agreement on disarmament, but we can get along without it; all we need to do is to go on improving our nuclear weapons, to increase their power and not to allow this policy of the armaments race to be hindered in any way. In expressing these ideas with truly extraordinary levity, Mr. Godber even went so far as to try to identify the policy of the Soviet Union with that of the Western Powers in the question of the armaments race (ibid., p.27).

No, Mr. Godber, do not include the Soviet Union in the same company as the Western Powers in this matter. It was not the Soviet Union which initiated the nuclear arms race which is so dangerous to the world, nor is it the Soviet Union which is preventing its cessation. For the Soviet Union, the manufacture and improvement of nuclear weapons was merely a retaliatory measure. Moreover, it was precisely the Soviet Union which put forward the idea of general and complete disarmament, and for many a year it has been exerting efforts in order to reach an agreement to embody this noble idea in something practical, namely, a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

A vicious circle is created: the Western Powers say that they will continue and intensify the nuclear arms race as long as there is no agreement on disarmament, but at the same time they themselves are preventing a solution of the disarmament problem and, furthermore, are seriously complicating the negotiations on this question by their military measures. While creating this vicious circle, the Western Powers are obviously trying at the same time to lull the peoples, to allay their fears and to instil in them the idea that, on the whole, all is well and that there are no grounds for anxiety and alarm. How can this be described

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otherwise than as an attempt to turn the disarmament negotiations into something like a component part of the policy of the armaments race? But this cannot be tolerated, and the peoples will not tolerate it.

In this connexion, a noteworthy thought was expressed today by the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Mello Franco, when he said that, although the achievement of general and complete disarmament was an extended process, the halting of the armaments race could be achieved quite rapidly (supra, p.20).

In the statements made by various representatives an important place was given to the question of measures which must be taken as soon as possible to reduce in the very near future, even before agreement is reached on general and complete disarmament, the threat of a nuclear war. As we have already said, we share the opinion of all those who consider the adoption of such measures to be essential and extremely urgent. It is precisely because of the need in the present circumstances not to delay the adoption of measures for lessening the threat of a nuclear war that the Soviet Government has submitted for the Committee's consideration a draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and proposes that it should be considered as a matter of urgency. A sober evaluation of the situation now existing in the world cannot but lead to the conclusion that among all the individual measures which might help to reduce the threat of a nuclear war even before the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the key place belongs to putting an end to the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In the course of the discussions, one rather strange argument was advanced against the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, namely, that the implementation of this proposal would allegedly disturb the so-called "balance of forces" between the two groups of States. But I should like to ask the representatives of the Western Powers to what "balance of forces" or "balance of armaments" they are referring. Who measured this balance and on what scales? What grounds have you for asserting that, if United States submarines with Polaris nuclear missiles are based, let us say, on Naples or on Holy Loch, there will be a balance of forces, but that if they are not based there, there will be no such balance?

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What balance of forces can we talk about if, for instance, atomic submarines, each carrying sixteen Polaris missiles with thermonuclear warheads, are moved into the Mediterranean? Against what do the Western Powers intend to "balance" this striking force for nuclear attack? After all, there are no Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads in the Mediterranean area or in the territories of any States in other regions.

It is enough to put these questions to show the complete artificiality of the argument about a disturbance of the "balance of forces" in connexion with our proposal for renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. To speak about a disturbance of the balance would be possible in connexion with these measures only in the event of the balance you have in mind tottering on the brink of war. But that is something which cannot and must not be accepted by anyone who is interested in consolidating peace.

If we are to speak of the balance of forces in the modern world, it is obvious that it consists in something quite different. Leading statesmen in both the Soviet Union and the United States have repeatedly pointed out in their statements that both these powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, possess in their own territories such strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons to far-distant targets that they can deal a powerful nuclear blow to each other's territories. In this sense, there is indeed a balance of forces, an equality of power, and the geographic factors to which certain representatives of the Western Powers often refer to justify the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories are, of course, altogether irrelevant.

In the light of these considerations, how are we to regard the stationing of United States strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the territories of other States? Such measures cannot be assessed otherwise than as the expression of a policy aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantages over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is obvious that such unilateral military advantages are not being sought for in the interests of strengthening confidence between States. It seems to us that the comments made at meetings of the Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers on the draft declaration (ENDC/75)

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which we have submitted merely confirm the need to consider this draft in the Committee as soon as possible and in a business-like way.

In the course of the debate some representatives of the Western Powers said that the Committee should discuss so-called measures to prevent war by accident. In this connexion they mentioned the proposal submitted by the United States on 12 December 1962 (ENDC/70). Well, the Soviet Union is always prepared to take part in a serious discussion of any proposals which would lead to a reduction of the risk of war, in deeds and not in words. But we can state quite categorically that at least some of the proposals contained in the United States working paper of 12 December 1962 are not at all aimed at reducing the risk of war, but mainly at creating conditions for espionage by locating observation posts on the territories of States, carrying out aerial surveys, setting up mobile observation teams and so forth. Moreover, it is proposed to carry out these measures in the conditions of the armaments race, and not in conditions of disarmament. One can well understand that no constructive results can be achieved on the basis of such proposals. No contribution towards reducing the risk of war can be made by following that path.

Now a few words on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We should like to stress today that we fully share the desire expressed by many delegations to achieve a solution of this urgent question as rapidly as possible. But we should be lacking in sincerity if we did not say that the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers on the question of the cessation of tests have further increased the disappointment we felt when, in response to the constructive step taken by the Soviet Union in agreeing to the principle of on-site inspection and to a number of inspections as well as to the location of automatic seismic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers, the Western Powers countered with the resumption of nuclear tests and a virtual refusal to negotiate on the basis proposed by the Soviet Union, which took into account essentially all the basic principles which they themselves had previously put forward.

What, in fact, did the United States representative say here in the Committee on the question of cessation of tests? He continued to insist on the unfounded demands of the Western Powers in regard to a quota of inspections and the number of

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automatic seismic stations on the territory of each nuclear Power. The attempt to justify the number of inspections by referring to some sort of scientific approach should mislead no one. This is a purely political problem, and science has absolutely nothing to do with it. Yesterday the representative of Canada made some noteworthy remarks in this regard (ENDC/PV.97, pp.20,21).

The demand that now, while we still have no agreement on the two main problems - the number of inspections and the number of automatic stations - negotiations should be concentrated on the discussion of elements of the control system, such as what should be the nationality of the members of inspection teams, can only delay the preparation of an agreement, especially if we take into consideration the approach which the United States has in mind for the solution of these questions. For example, it has been asserted here that there is some kind of connexion between the aforesaid question of the nationality of the members of inspection teams and the question of what should be the quota of inspections, although, of course, it is impossible to see any connexion if we approach the matter without a preconceived opinion. We can just imagine where such negotiations will lead us, if one of the sides uses such a method in considering the remaining outstanding questions. The statements of the representatives of the Western Powers merely confirm our view that these Powers are not seeking to conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests, but merely to prolong the negotiations.

Meanwhile, the United States of America is apparently determined to continue to explode nuclear weapons for the purpose of further improving them, to the accompaniment of a low buzz of endless speeches on details of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. In this connexion we have drawn attention to the way in which the United States representative tried to justify the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States. He stated that tests would have to continue until the United States is able to achieve an agreement which is really acceptable to it (ENDC/PV.96, p.35). It is difficult to interpret this otherwise than as an expression of the intention of the Government of the United States of America to continue testing nuclear weapons in the future, thus flagrantly disregarding the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly for a cessation of these tests by all States by 1 January 1963 (resolution 1762 (XVII); ENDC/63), and at the same time to put forward obviously unacceptable conditions for an agreement. Such an approach, of course, is not designed to facilitate the achievement of an agreement.



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

We are reluctant to focus attention on the way in which the United States representative tried to give a reason for the United States Government's decision to resume nuclear weapon tests, namely, an order made by the President of the United States on this question. This argument is irrelevant, to say the least, for it is self-evident that no order made by the head of any State can deprive a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of its force, nor can it be regarded as binding on States Members of the United Nations. Yet, if we were to listen to the United States representative, it would turn out that it would suffice for the President of the United States to order the resumption of nuclear weapon tests for all States to regard such tests as the supreme good, and to ignore a General Assembly resolution containing an appeal to the nuclear Powers to cease such tests.

If the statement made by the President of the United States on 26 January, which was read out here, (ENDC/PV.96, p.34) bears witness to anything, it is only to the fact that it is precisely the position of the United States Government, which intends to continue a series of nuclear tests, which is preventing the achievement of an agreement on their prohibition. If the Western Powers still wish to achieve such an agreement, let them back up their words with practical deeds.

It can be said without exaggeration that never before have there been such favourable conditions for solving the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests as there are at the present time. We must not lose the opportunity which is now offered to us, because the international situation might change, and then the conditions might not be so favourable. Several representatives, including the representative of Nigeria, have already mentioned this. As the representative of Italy said, we must strike while the iron is hot. And if the Western Powers have the good will, an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests for ever can now be forged very rapidly. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we repeat once again that for us there is no question of whether or not to conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests. We are firmly in favour of its conclusion and have taken the necessary steps to meet the Western Powers in this matter. It is now first and foremost for the United States to act.

Mr. GCDBER (United Kingdom): Considering the time, I shall seek to speak briefly today, and perhaps I can revert on another occasion to one or two of the points which have arisen in the debate.

The representative of the Soviet Union made several references to me, and I shall seek to deal with them all when there is time. But there is one particular point that I feel I must take up - where he seemed to be charging me with not being sufficiently serious in relation to general disarmament. I tried to take his words down at one stage when he seemed to imply that I had been saying that we might as well do without an agreement on disarmament. Really, that is absurd. Everyone who heard my speech at our ninety-sixth meeting must know that it is absurd, and I would just remind them of the passage in my speech which seems to me to be the only one to which the representative of the Soviet Union could have been referring. At that time I was dealing with the fact that our Soviet colleague, in his speech just before mine, had appeared to be charging the West with bad faith - as, incidentally, he did once more this morning when he referred to the subject of testing, and again said that the Western Powers are not striving to end nuclear tests. I said then that I deplored these constant charges of bad faith against the West; I do not think they help and in fact I think they very materially hinder. I went on to say:

"I think the basic thing to remember is that until there is some clear agreement on these issues of disarmament obviously all the countries concerned are going to continue to watch their own national security to the full, whether it be the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union or anyone else. Until we have clear agreements, and confidence that those agreements are going to be fulfilled, we are not going to have a sudden cessation in the development of all weapons. Regrettable though that may be, it is a simple fact which it would be folly for us not to accept." (ENDC/PV.96, p.27)

I developed that point at some length.

Then I said:

"I would say, by all means let us get agreement to stop the armaments race but let us not pretend that one country is more virtuous than the others in relation to that at the present time." (ibid.)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I would repeat that last sentence to Mr. Kuznetsov today, because it does seem from his comments that he is claiming that the Soviet Union is more virtuous in this regard. Though I do not want to remind him of things, I would only say in this connexion that the very existence of NATO is a proof of the menace which other countries rightly or wrongly believed at the time NATO was set up that they were under from the Soviet Union. Fears are not one-sided in this respect. To pretend that they are really makes our task more difficult, and so I ask our Soviet colleague please not to distort what I have said. It may be that his remark was due to a genuine misunderstanding. If so, I am glad to have this opportunity to clear it up once more.

I should like now to say a few words about nuclear tests. I know it is a matter of major concern to all of us, and I believe we all ought to be striving to put an end to these tests. Certainly I would repeat for the benefit of our Soviet colleague that the United Kingdom is indeed so striving, as it has been doing throughout.

May I try to recapitulate the position as I see it now? The Soviet Government has reverted to the acceptance of the principle which it had in fact previously accepted up to November 1961 - the principle of a small annual quota of on-site inspections. The Soviet Government has of course not reverted to the other matters to which it had agreed prior to that, namely, the acceptance of fifteen internationally-manned detection posts, but on the other hand it does now offer three automatic recording stations within the territory of the Soviet Union (ENDC/73, p.3). This is what the Soviet Union has offered. If I may interpose here, several speakers from the Soviet bloc have taken up a phrase which I used in my last speech to the Conference - I am honoured that they should study so closely what I say - when I spoke about the Soviet Union making concessions to common sense rather than concessions to the West (ENDC/PV.96, p.30). Some of them waxed a little irritable about that and said that it meant that all the common sense was on the side of the West. I would not go so far as to say that, but I am always willing to see more evidence of it from the other side. However, what I would like to point out is that of course the concessions have not in fact been one-sided, and while the Soviet Union has, I am glad to say, made certain concessions to common sense, the West also has made many concessions to common sense, and I suggest that we should both continue to try to do so in so far as our sense enables us to do it.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

May I just point out one or two of the concessions which the West itself has made in relation to nuclear tests even since we were last meeting around this table in December? It was during that period that we in the West made concessions to common sense. We have made concessions to our latest scientific evaluations, we have made concessions seeking to get agreement, and we have modified our position because we no longer ask for an annual quota of inspections on a sliding-scale of between twelve and twenty but have now offered to discuss a figure between eight and ten subject, of course, to the other elements being agreed. The West no longer asks for any internationally-manned stations in the Soviet Union. It has also offered to accept unmanned automatic stations in the Soviet Union, and so, as a result, the West no longer asks for international observers at nationally-manned posts. Those are important new moves, important new concessions made by the West during the recess.

Perhaps I could here say just one word about the comments made today by the representative of Bulgaria on statements made both by me and by Sir Michael Wright before the recess on the actual numbers of on-site inspections (supra, p. 23 ). I have studied both the quotations and the relevant comments on them since the speech of the Bulgarian representative this morning. In regard to myself I would only say that I do not think that the quotation made from my speech really justifies the claims made about it. In that particular speech (ENDC/PV.86, p.49) I was giving illustrations related to the short interim period such as had been suggested by other representatives around this table, in which I had not suggested any figure myself in relation to the period of time. I was merely giving illustrations about a short interim period and it would be ludicrous to pretend that I was there putting forward a formal proposal of numbers for an annual quota. The Western position was well known at that time, and I was merely indicating that in a short interim period there would obviously not be a large number of inspections before we got on to the full arrangements under an agreed treaty.

In relation to the quotation from the speech of Sir Michael Wright, the position is even more clear in that he did in fact quote in full the draft text of the treaty article submitted by the Soviet Union, in which no figure for on-site inspections had been given. He said that those proposals had been presented by Mr. Tsarapkin, and he went on to say:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"...if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed..." (ENDC/PV.87, p.8)

He went on later to give the figures in relation to on-site inspections. Later he said:

"... if it is objected that such a system" -  
with complete inspection -

"would result in too many inspections - perhaps forty or fifty a year in a given country - there is the second alternative of a quota, perhaps ten or twelve, or fewer, which would amount to a deterrent inspection of, say, one in four or five events which by decision of the commission qualify for inspection." (ibid., pp.9,10)

Those are the words which Sir Michael Wright used on that occasion. I hope that makes it abundantly clear that the Western position was not as has been suggested in some speeches. I merely make that point to get the record clear.

I should like just for a moment to see where the new moves - and I welcome the new Soviet move - of the Soviet Union and of the West leave us at the present time. I believe they take us a considerable way forward. As I see it, there is no longer disagreement on principles. On the contrary, both sides are now in agreement on the principles and indeed on the essentials of a treaty. We are in agreement that a treaty should cover all environments. We are in agreement that all events should be monitored by nationally-manned stations reporting to a commission. We are in agreement that so far as underground events are concerned there may be a small number of automatic stations whose records would be fed to the commission by the international staff of the commission. Those records would, as I see it, both have a value of their own and serve as monitors on reports from the nationally-manned stations themselves. Those are substantial areas of agreement.

What is the gap that remains to be bridged? As I see it, the gap consists of two elements. The first is composed of certain questions regarding the nature of inspection and the nature of the automatic stations which the Soviet Union was unwilling to clarify in the discussions in New York and Washington and on which I hope we shall be able to have clarification when the Sub-Committee resumes its work. I should like for the moment to refer to those areas which have not been clarified as shaded areas - areas of doubt. I should like to indicate briefly what they are.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

To begin with there is the question of how inspections within a quota should be initiated and, having been initiated, how they would be carried out. Those questions, of course, involve certain safeguards, and they involve those safeguards for both sides: there is nothing unilateral in this. They cover guarantees against espionage; they cover guarantees of satisfactory composition of inspection teams; and they cover agreement on the maximum area to be inspected in any one particular on-site inspection. Then, of course, there is the question of the type of equipment which each of the automatic stations should contain. That is a technical problem, but it is a technical problem which I would suggest ought not to present any real difficulty.

The second element we are faced with is that of numbers purely - the number of inspections and the number of automatic stations. The Soviet Union's position, as I understand it, is to offer two to three annual inspections and to offer three automatic recording stations, and it offers that without first working out an agreement on the shaded areas. The offer is apparently - as far as I can tell at present, and I do not wish to put it unreasonably at all - a take it or leave it offer.

The Western position, on the other hand, is that the Western Powers have offered to discuss eight to ten inspections and seven to ten automatic stations. We have said that those offers are not made on a take it or leave it basis, but are linked with agreement on the shaded areas and are flexible and subject to negotiation.

The two sides, I submit, are much nearer together than they have ever been before. Both sides have made advances during the recess; both sides have made concessions. It should now be our job to capitalize on those advances and to find means of building a bridge which will span the whole gap instead of just part of it. The important thing, the essential thing, at this stage of the negotiation is that nobody ought to be slamming a door.

For the United Kingdom I would say that we are prepared for whatever further form of discussion or negotiation may prove to be the most constructive. It may be that which was suggested yesterday by the representative of Canada, namely, to reach agreement on the shaded areas and then to try to clinch the figures; or it may be that some other method of procedure will commend itself.

Those are the positions as I see them, and I thought it might be helpful to recapitulate them in this way.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I listened with care to the speeches made this morning by our colleagues from Brazil and Nigeria, and we shall welcome the views of our colleagues from the other non-aligned nations, but that is the position as I see it at the moment, and I hope very much that good sense - common sense - and good will on both sides will help us to bridge the gap. But we will not bridge it by wasting our time imputing bad faith to one another. I do not seek to do so. I understand the difficulties that face the Soviet Union. I suggest that the Soviet Union should try to understand our difficulties too, and together we may then reach agreement.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say a few words by way of reply to Mr. Godber. His remarks concerning the statements made by the Soviet delegation and a number of other delegations merely confirm the correctness of our conclusion that the armaments race which is now being intensified and carried on by the Western Powers makes our negotiations more difficult. In the present case playing with words such as commonsense, absurdity or even insanity, is out of place in the Committee and can hardly lead to constructive negotiations. We are discussing extremely important problems, problems affecting the vital interests of all the peoples. They are important problems as to which measures should be worked out and, moreover, worked out in the shortest possible time, in order to halt the arms race, reduce the risk of a thermo-nuclear war and to give the peoples the prospect and assurance of a future.

With regard to NATO, it is well-known that this is an aggressive treaty directed against the socialist countries and against all peace-loving States. As a counter measure, the socialist countries entered into the Warsaw Treaty. The socialist countries have repeatedly put forward proposals aimed at improving relations between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and those belonging to NATO. At one time it was proposed to do away with both treaties: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. However, the States members of NATO refused to do this. Now there is a proposal in the Committee for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States forming the NATO bloc and the States of the Warsaw Treaty. If the Western Powers sincerely desire to improve the situation, there is now a favourable opportunity, especially for the United Kingdom, to demonstrate this desire and to support the proposal for the conclusion of a pact.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

As regards the cessation of tests, I have already stated my views this morning. We consider that we should first settle the main question -- the question of the number of inspections, the principle of which has been already agreed. It is also necessary to settle the question of the number of automatic stations. We should now concentrate our efforts on settling these questions and not allow ourselves to be diverted to a great number of technical problems which may lead our Committee into a side-track away from the solution of our most urgent problem.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have had the opportunity of hearing the representative of the United Kingdom speak, chiefly on nuclear tests. We are glad that he has defined his country's position on this matter, and we are also gratified to learn that his delegation is always ready to discuss this question in order to find a solution to the problem.

Mr. Godber was good enough to refer also to certain problems which we have raised in regard to the number of inspections, and which have been discussed at former debates. He said that we have misquoted statements made by his delegation on these questions. I will, of course, return to this when the problem of nuclear tests is discussed. But since the matter has been referred to today, I should like to give some further quotations to define the position taken up by the United Kingdom at certain moments in our discussions. We are all well aware that the United Kingdom representative is gifted with a vivid imagination and we are always glad to listen to him especially when he is in the wrong, because that is when his replies are at their best. I should, however, like to quote from those speeches in order to show what the situation really is.

In his intervention of 5 December the United Kingdom representative, then Sir Michael Wright, spoke of nuclear tests and the desire of the Western Powers to conclude a general and complete treaty on them. He said:

"But what I am saying is that, if the Soviet Government were willing today to take the position that it took for two years until almost exactly a year ago, a comprehensive treaty could no doubt be signed by 1 January 1963." (ENDC/PV.87, p.8)



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Now what is this statement about? It refers to the number of inspections. Well, the Soviet Union's position on the number of inspections was already very clear. A book published by the United States authorities says that until April 1961 the Soviet Union always refused to agree to the Western proposals and always proposed three inspections only. So three inspections had been proposed by the Soviet Union. And when we see that the United Kingdom wanted the Soviet Union to return precisely to its former position, the United Kingdom of course wanted the Soviet Union to return to its proposal of three inspections, since it has made no other proposal on this matter.

Secondly, referring to his own speech of 3 December, Mr. Godber explained that when at that time he stated:

"Does the representative of the Soviet Union really tell us that those two, three or four on-site inspections in six months would make any difference to Soviet security arrangements?" (ENDC/PV.86, p.49).

he was speaking of an intermediate period during which the application of the agreement to discontinue nuclear tests would be tried.

But must we understand that when one is bargaining or trying to do business in certain countries and wishes to sell goods, and fixes the price at 2, 3, 4, it is not the 2 but the 4 that counts? When a merchant is selling something, the lowest price he quotes is obviously the one that counts. The United Kingdom representative stated that in this trial period two inspections should be made. Which figure must we take? Surely the lowest figure which he quoted at that time.

I think that Mr. Godber's explanations are clear evidence of his rich imagination, as I have already said. But they do not persuade us that he did not say what in fact he did say at that time. I should, however, like to emphasize - to his credit so to speak - that at that time, and perhaps also now, the United Kingdom was extremely anxious to settle something, and proposed a figure which has not been upheld in subsequent discussions. But it is surely not our fault that the United Kingdom did in fact quote the figure I have just mentioned.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I will not comment on the many points that the Soviet representative has brought up in his remarks, other than to say that the statement about the intentions of NATO is obviously completely inaccurate. I think we can safely leave judgement on those intentions to any objective person.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I must also make the comment that the statement to the effect that the numbers have been agreed on and that the number for on-site inspections is that put forward by the Soviet Union is, of course, also inaccurate. I would reserve the right to speak on that in detail at a later discussion.

I asked to speak for a moment, despite the lateness of the hour, first in order to thank Mr. Mbu for his very kind comments about Mr. Dean and to tell him that we will make sure that those sentiments are relayed to him.

Secondly, in view of the fact that many representatives have welcomed my presence here, in the hope that some good may come out of it, I should like to reverse that slightly and take this opportunity, on behalf of the United States delegation, to express deep gratitude to one of us who is about to depart, namely, Sir Michael Wright.

I believe this is Sir Michael's last sitting in his position of representing the United Kingdom. To my knowledge, Sir Michael has participated in many conferences in Geneva starting shortly after the first nuclear test Conference in 1958, taking part in all those early sessions. He has made tremendous contributions of wisdom and persuasion, has enlightened many participants and has been of tremendous help. In addition, in 1960 he participated in the Ten-Nation Conference on general and complete disarmament, as well as the discussions on a nuclear test ban. Of course he has also participated since last March in the sessions of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to express publicly on behalf of my delegation, and I hope on behalf of others round this table, the gratitude and appreciation we have for his long and devoted service in the cause to which we are all devoting our talents and for which, I am sure, we all hope success.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): If you will permit me to say one word - which I find a little difficult to express owing to my combined feeling of gratitude and embarrassment - it will be this: that I should like to leave behind me, if I may, one legacy to this Conference. That legacy is my own will and determination to see a nuclear test ban treaty achieved. Perhaps I may particularly designate that I should like to leave that legacy in my testament to Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Tsarapkin.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I think that I shall be expressing the sentiments of all representatives present in this room if I say how much we shall regret the absence of Sir Michael Wright from our midst. We have always admired his intelligence, his brilliance and his wit. We are sure that he will maintain a keen interest in our work and our best wishes accompany him.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-eighth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Blusztajn, the representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Brazil, Bulgaria, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The representative of the United States and the Chairman of the meeting, who spoke on behalf of all the members of the Committee, expressed appreciation of the contribution made to the work of the Committee by Sir Michael Wright, who was taking leave of his post as the deputy leader of the United Kingdom delegation.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 18 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

